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Abstract
In order to analyze the privatization policies undertaken by the national and regional governments,
we consider a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country consists of
two regions of different sizes. We show that public-sector intervention by either the national or
regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum, because a private duopoly does
not achieve the social optimum. However, not all public interventions in firms are better than the
private duopoly. On the other hand, the preferences of consumers and firms about privatization policy
are completely opposite. Finally, the privatization policies of regional governments are completely
opposite from one region to the other, and do not coincide with that of the national government.
Overall, this paper shows that the relative size of regions is an important feature in the design of the
privatization policies implemented by national and regional governments.
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1 Introduction
In the eighties the British government began a wave of privatization that was echoed across the world in
the following years. Bortolotti et al. (2003) empirically show that privatization takes place typically in
wealthy democracies with high public debt, but endowed with deep and liquid stock markets.1 They show
that legal institutions are also important, in the sense that the law should provide protection for private
investment. However, at the end of 2000, governments retained control of two-thirds of privatized firms.
In civil law countries, governments tend to retain large ownership positions, whereas in common law
countries they typically use golden shares. To put it another way, governments hold more influence over
privatized firms in countries with proportional electoral rules and with a centralized system of political
authority (Bortolotti and Faccio (2009)). Thus, in the current recession, which affects to most of the
countries in the world, a new wave of privatization across the world can be expected, in which the local
governments in each country may play an important role. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze strategic
interaction at the privatization stage between local governments and the government of the nation to
which they belong.
In this paper I develop a model that analyzes strategic interaction between different tiers of govern-
ment and its consequences on the markets, without neglecting a welfare analysis. Given the presence
of firms owned by national and regional governments in many industries, the insights behind the pa-
per can be incorporated into the analysis of different industries, e.g. the airport sector (Albalate et al.
(2012) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2012)), the broadcasting market (Bel and Domènech (2009) and
González-Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2010, 2012)), hospital markets (Brekke et al. (2008), Aiura and
Sanjo (2010) and Aiura (2013)), the university system (De Fraja and Valbonesi (2012) and Cremer and
Maldonado (2013)), and the development of public facilities (Takahashi (2004)) among others.
The question of whether it is advisable to privatize public firms has been widely analyzed previously.
In a seminal paper that assumes quantity competition and homogenous goods, De Fraja and Delbono
(1989) show that the existence of a public firm is socially desirable if the number of firms is low enough.
However, I consider horizontal product differentiation as in Cremer et al. (1991). They show that it is
only when the total number of firms is two or at least six that a mixed oligopoly with one public firm
is socially preferable to a private oligopoly. Following Matsumura (1998), I allow partial privatization,
so a partially public-owned firm takes both profits and welfare into consideration. Matsumura (1998)
analyzes a duopoly model with quantity competition and finds that neither full privatization nor full
nationalization is optimal. As in my model, recent research has focused on analyzing privatization
policies in horizontal product differentiation models with price competition. For instance, Kumar and
Saha (2008) show that unless public ownership exceeds a critical level, maximal differentiation continues
to hold and social welfare does not improve with public ownership. Sanjo (2009) analyses simultaneous
price choice and sequential price choice and shows that the degree of privatization of a publicly owned
firm influences social welfare in a mixed duopoly market. From this last paper, Martínez-Sánchez (2011)
1This result is also supported by Albalate et al. (2012), who find that it is more likely for airports to be privatized in
countries with higher public debt.
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shows that in the location game, in which firms set prices simultaneously, social welfare depends on the
degree of privatization and is only maximized if the partially privatized firm is a fully publicly owned
firm.
Previous papers have considered that public firms are owned by national governments that are con-
cerned for the social welfare of their countries. Thus, they omit firms owned by regional governments
that are concerned only for the social welfare of their regions. However, such firms are present in many
sectors: the airport sector (Albalate et al. (2012)), the broadcasting market (Bel and Domènech (2009)),
hospital markets (Aiura (2013)), the university system (De Fraja and Valbonesi (2012)), the development
of public facilities (Takahashi (2004)), etc. My model incorporates regional public firms and analyzes
the strategic interaction between them, the government of the country to which they belong and private
owners. A recent paper by Tomaru and Nakamura (2012) studies a mixed oligopoly model with quantity
competition in a country comprised of two regions. They find that when the national and regional gov-
ernments independently consider whether to privatize their respective public firms, only the state-owned
public firm should be privatized. A paper with features similar to mine is Inoue et al. (2012), in which a
regional public firm competes against a private firm. They allow firms to choose their location and prices,
but they do not allow partial privatization of the regional public firm. Finally, they show the existence of
two types of equilibrium: i) the regional public and private firms locate in different regions; and ii) both
firms locate in the same region.
My paper is related to the literature on the privatization policies of national governments in an
international context. Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2005a, 2005b) analyze strategic interaction between
governments when they decide whether to privatize their publicly-owned firms. They consider two equal
countries that form a single market in which there is free trade and firms produce a homogeneous good
and decide its output level.2 Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2005b) find that when the marginal cost of
the publicly-owned firms takes an intermediate value, each government wants it to be the government
of the other country that privatizes its publicly-owned firm. In addition, Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón
(2005a) includes the existence of a supra-national authority, whose goal is to maximize social welfare in
both countries. They show that if the supra-national authority decides whether or not to privatize public
firms, the aggregate politically weighted welfare is no less than if the decision is taken by the governments.
A feature of the aforementioned papers that consider horizontal differentiation is that consumers are
uniformly distributed across a linear segment. However, I break with this assumption here. Previously,
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2002) examine the importance of the distribution of consumers in Hotelling’s
circle in a comparison between the optimal and market equilibrium levels of diversity. They find that
when most consumers are located very close to the firms, the result of Salop -that the equilibrium
number of firms is larger than the optimal one- can be reversed. Benassi et al. (2006) use a trapezoid
distribution and show that overall more concentrated incomes imply stronger product differentiation.
Recently, Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) have developed a new variant of the Hotelling model in which
the segment where consumers are distributed is divided into two, so there are two "natural" markets with
2Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2005a, 2005b) do not allow partial privatization by governments.
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different sizes. In a private duopoly, they show that equilibrium prices increase whenever the disparity
of consumers decreases.
In short, I analyze the privatization policies undertaken by national and regional governments, under
which they have the option to partially privatize firms. To that end I consider a horizontal differentiation
model with price competition in which a country is divided into two regions. Following Gabszewicz and
Wauthy (2012), I assume that one region is more densely populated. We show that public intervention
by either the national or regional government is essential for achieving the social optimum, because the
private duopoly does not achieve the social optimum. However, not all public interventions in firms are
better than the private duopoly. On the other hand, the preferences of consumers and firms about market
structures are completely opposite: consumers prefer the intervention regional governments while firms
prefer the intervention of the national government in the firm located in the smaller region. Finally, the
preferences of the two regional governments about market structures are also completely opposite and do
not coincide with that of the national government.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model formally. Sections 3, 4 and 5 consider
the regional duopoly, the national mixed duopoly and the private duopoly, respectively. The equilibrium
of these duopolies is analyzed in Section 6. Regional mixed duopolies are analyzed in Section 7. Section
8 provides a social welfare analysis with all the market structures developed in the paper. Section 9
concludes.
2 The Model
A unit mass of consumers is distributed in the [0, 1] interval, which represents the location of the consumers
in a country which is divided into two regions: [0, 1/2], which is referred to here as Region 0, and [1/2, 1]
which is referred to as Region 1. It is assumed that the regions have different population densities (or
relative sizes). In particular, with no loss of generality, the density of Region 0 is µ ∈ (0, 1/2) and that of
Region 1 is 1− µ, as in Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012), which means that most consumers are located
in Region 1. There are two firms that sell a single product and are located at the two endpoints of the
unit interval [0, 1]: one is located at zero and indexed by 0 and the other is located at one and indexed
by 1. Notice that firm 0 is located in Region 0 and firm 1 is located in Region 1. It is assumed that each
consumer can buy at most one unit of the product. Thus, the utility of the consumer located at x is:
U(x) =
{
v − x− p0 if he buys from firm 0,
v − (1− x)− p1 if he buys from firm 1,
(1)
where v represents the consumer’s utility obtained from buying from his/her location, pi represents
the price of the product i = 0, 1, and x and 1− x represent the disutility from not buying from his/her
location if he/she buys from firm 0 and firm 1, respectively. Thus, consumers located in [0, 1/2] prefer to
buy the product offered by firm 0 than that offered by firm 1 at equal prices, and conversely consumers
located in [1/2, 1] prefer product 1 to product 0 at equal prices. Since µ ∈ (0, 1/2), most consumers prefer
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to buy from firm 1 than from firm 0 at equal prices. It is assumed that v is high enough for all consumers
to buy at least from one firm. From the utility function (1), it is possible to find the consumer who is
indifferent between buying from firm 0 and firm 1, which is given by:
x̂ (p0, p1) =
1
2
+
p1 − p0
2
. (2)
In order to obtain the demand functions of the two firms, two cases must be analyzed: (i) when the
indifferent consumer is located in Region 0, x̂ (p0, p1) < 1/2, and (ii) when he/she is located in Region
1, x̂ (p0, p1) > 1/2. Thus, if p0 > p1, then x̂ (p0, p1) < 1/2, which means that there are some consumers
in Region 0 that buy products from the firm located in Region 1. In particular, [x̂ (p0, p1) , 1/2]. On the
other hand, if p0 < p1, then x̂ (p0, p1) > 1/2, which means that there are some consumers in Region 1
that buy from firm 0. In particular, [1/2, x̂ (p0, p1)]. Thus, taking into account that the densities of the
regions are different, the demand functions are:
D0 (p0, p1) =
{
µ+(1−µ)(p1−p0)
2 if p0 ≤ p1
µ(1+p1−p0)
2 if p0 ≥ p1
(3)
D1 (p0, p1) =
{
(1−µ)(1−p1+p0)
2 if p0 ≤ p1
1−µ−µ(p1−p0)
2 if p0 ≥ p1
(4)
It is assumed that the fixed cost of developing a product and the marginal cost are zero. Thus, the
profit function of each firm is:
pi0 (p0, p1) =
{
p0
µ+(1−µ)(p1−p0)
2 if p0 ≤ p1
p0
µ(1+p1−p0)
2 if p0 ≥ p1
(5)
pi1 (p0, p1) =
{
p1
(1−µ)(1−p1+p0)
2 if p0 ≤ p1
p1
1−µ−µ(p1−p0)
2 if p0 ≥ p1
(6)
A third kind of agent consider here is comprised of regional governments that maximize regional social
welfare. The social welfare of Region i is defined as the sum of the profit of the firm profit and the surplus
of the consumers located in Region i, i.e. Wi = pii +CSi i = 0, 1, where
CS0 =

µ
∫ 1
2
0
(v − x− p0) dx if p0 ≤ p1
µ
∫ x̂
0
(v − x− p0) dx+ µ
∫ 1
2
x̂
(v − (1− x)− p1) dx if p0 ≥ p1.
(7)
CS1 =

(1− µ)
(∫ x̂
1
2
(v − x− p0) dx+
∫ 1
x̂
(v − (1− x)− p1) dx
)
if p0 ≤ p1
(1− µ)
∫ 1
1
2
(v − (1− x)− p1) dx if p0 ≥ p1.
(8)
In the model proposed here regional governments may become shareholders of the firms located in
their regions. Thus, the aims of these firms depend on the composition of their boards because regional
government representatives advocate maximizing regional social welfare and private shareholders advocate
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a profit motive. Following Matsumura (1998), it is assumed here that the board of a partially publicly-
owned regional firm seeks to maximize a well-balanced mean between its profit and regional social welfare,
where the weights are the stakes held in it by the regional government and by private owners. The
government of Region i is considered to own a stake of αi ∈ [0, 1] and the private owners 1 − αi of the
partially publicly-owned firm located in Region i, so the objective function of partially publicly-owned
firms is Πi = αiWi + (1− αi)pii i = 0, 1. Notice that full privatization is achieved when αi = 0. The
timing of the game is as follows:
i) in order to maximize regional social welfare, each regional government simultaneously chooses its
share in the partially publicly-owned firm located in its region, αi i = 0, 1; and,
ii) finally, firms simultaneously set prices.
In the following section, this game is solved by backward induction.
3 Regional Duopoly
From the profit functions of firm 0 and firm 1, (5) and (6), and the consumer surpluses of regions 0 and
1, (7) and (8), the expressions for social welfare in each region are found, i.e.:
W0 = pi0 +CS0 =

4vµ−µ+4(1−µ)p0(p1−p0)
8 if p0 ≤ p1
µ(4v−1+2(p21−p20))
8 if p0 ≥ p1
(9)
W1 = pi1 +CS1 =

(1−µ)(4v−2(p21−p20)−1)
8 if p0 ≤ p1
(1−µ)(4v−1)+4µp1(p0−p1)
8 if p0 ≥ p1,
(10)
Taking into account theses expressions, I maximize the objective functions Π0 (with respect to p0)
and Π1 (with respect to p1), and obtain the firms’ reaction functions, which are:
p0 (p1) =
{
(1−α0)µ
2(1−µ) +
p1
2 if p0 ≤ p1
(p1 + 1)
1−α0
2−α0 if p0 ≥ p1,
(11)
p1 (p0) =
{
(p0 + 1)
1−α1
2−α1 if p0 ≤ p1
(1−α1)(1−µ)
2µ +
p0
2 if p0 ≥ p1.
(12)
From the intersection of the price reaction function of regional publicly-owned firms, the prices at this
stage of the game are found, i.e.:
p0 (α0, α1) =
{
µ+1−α1−µα0(2−α1)
(1−µ)(3−α1) if p0 ≤ p1
(1−α0)(1+µ−α1+µα1)
µ(3−α0) if p0 ≥ p1
; p1 (α0, α1) =
{
(1−α1)(2−µ−µα0)
(3−α1)(1−µ) if p0 ≤ p1
(2−α0)(1−α1(1−µ))−µ
µ(3−α0) if p0 ≥ p1
(13)
Each regional government now maximizes the social welfare of its region, so that by substituting firms’
prices (13) in regional social welfare functions (9) and (10), and maximizing these functions with respect
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to α0 and α1 , respectively, the regional governments’ reaction functions of the share in the partially
publicly-owned firms are found:
α0 (α1) =
{
5µ−1+α1(2−4µ−α1(1−µ))
2µ(2−α1) if p0 ≤ p1
3µ
2µ−(1−µ)α1+1 if p0 ≥ p1
;α1 (α0) =
{
3(1−µ)
3−2µ−µα0 if p0 ≤ p1
4−5µ+α0(4µ−µα0−2)
2(2−α0)(1−µ) if p0 ≥ p1
From the intersection of the above reaction functions and taking into account that αi ∈ [0, 1], the
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of this game is obtained, in which each regional government fully
owns the firm that is located at its region. As a result, both regional publicly-owned firms set the same
price, so the indifferent consumer is located at the border between the two regions, x̂R = 1/2. Thus,
consumers buy the product from the firm located in their region. These results are summarized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the SPE of the Regional Duopoly, regional governments fully control firms (αR0 =
αR1 = 1) and the prices, indifferent consumer, consumer surplus and social welfare are:
pR0 = p
R
1 = 0; x̂
R =
1
2
;CSR0 =W
R
0 = µW
R;CSR1 =W
R
1 = (1− µ)WR;CSR =WR =
4v − 1
8
. (14)
An interesting result is that both firms set the same price at the SPE, although they face markets
with different sizes. What is more they set a price of zero and thus do not obtain any revenue. Thus,
the regional social welfare coincides with the regional consumer surplus for each region. Moreover,
the regional social welfare depends on the population density of the region so that WR0 < W
R
1 since
µ ∈ (0, 1/2). However, the national social welfare does not depend on the relative sizes of the regions.
Given that firms cannot discriminate on prices according to the location of consumers, the best way of
maximizing the regional social welfare is to set the lowest price (which is zero) and maximize the regional
consumer surplus.
4 National Mixed Duopoly
In order to analyze and compare the results obtained with those of the regional duopoly, I now consider
the intervention of the national government as a shareholder of a publicly-owned firm. It is concerned
for the social welfare of the country, which is defined as the sum of the social welfare of both regions,
W =W0+W1.
3 Taking into account the regional social welfare functions (9) and (10), the expression of
national social welfare is found to be the following:
W =
{
4v−1−2(1−µ)(p0−p1)2
8 if p0 ≤ p1
4v−1−2µ(p0−p1)2
8 if p0 ≥ p1
(15)
In this section the regional governments do not participate in the game. Thus, the partially national
publicly-owned firm competes against a private firm that maximizes its profit. The aims of the partially
3An equivalent definition of national social welfare is: the sum of firms’ profits and the consumer surplus, W = pi0 +
pi1 + CS, where CS = CS0 + CS1.
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publicly-owned firm depend on the composition of its board because the national government’s repre-
sentatives advocate maximizing social welfare and private shareholders advocate a profit motive. It is
assumed here that the board of the partially publicly-owned firm seeks to maximize a well-balanced mean
between the national social welfare and its profit, where the weights are the stakes held by the government
and private owners. I consider that the national government owns a stake of α ∈ [0, 1] of the partially
publicly-owned firm and private owners 1 − α, so the objective function of the partially publicly-owned
firm is Πi = αW + (1− α)pii i = 0, 1. Notice that 1 − α measures the degree of privatization, so full
privatization is achieved when α = 0 and full nationalization when α = 1.
The timing of the game is as follows: (i) in order to maximize social welfare, the national government
chooses the firm in which it is to take a stake; (ii) next, it decides how big a stake to take in that firm,
α; and (iii) finally, firms simultaneously set prices.
In the following subsections, the subgames in which the national government partially owns firm 0
(subgame 0) and firm 1 (subgame 1) are solved.
4.1 Subgame 0
In this subgame, the national government takes a partial stake in firm 0, so firm 0 maximizes the objective
function Π0 (p0, p1) = αW + (1− α)pi0, which is given by:
Π0 (p0, p1) =
{
α4v−1−2(1−µ)(p0−p1)
2
8 + (1− α) p0
µ+(1−µ)(p1−p0)
2 if p0 ≤ p1
α4v−1−2µ(p0−p1)
2
8 + (1− α) p0µ1+p1−p02 if p0 ≥ p1.
(16)
Next I solve the third stage, in which firms simultaneously choose prices. Therefore, by maximizing the
function (16) with respect to p0, the reaction function of the partially publicly-owned firm 0 is obtained,
i.e.:
p0 (p1) =
{
(1−α)µ
(2−α)(1−µ) +
p1
2−α if p0 ≤ p1
1−α
2−α +
p1
2−α if p0 ≥ p1
(17)
Firm 1 is a private firm that aims to maximize the profit function (6). Thus, the reaction function of
this firm is:
p1 (p0) =
{
1
2 +
p0
2 if p0 ≤ p1
1−µ
2µ +
p0
2 if p0 ≥ p1.
(18)
From the interception of the above reaction functions, I obtain the prices at this stage, which are:
p0 (α) =
1 + µ− 2αµ
(1− µ) (3− 2α) ; p1 (α) =
2− α− µ
(1− µ) (3− 2α) .
Notice that p0 ≤ p1. By substituting the above prices in the social welfare function (15), it can be
evaluated at the second stage of this subgame. Thus, the expression of the social welfare is:
W (α) =
4v (3− 2α)2 (1− µ) + 16α− 6α2 − 8µ2
(
1 + α2
)
− 4αµ (7− 4µ− 3α) + 17µ− 11
8 (3− 2α)2 (1− µ)
(19)
In order to maximize the social welfare function (19), the government decides to fully nationalize firm
0, so that α0 = 1. This implies that both firms set the same price. Moreover, there is a multiplicity
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Figure 1: Equilibrium at subgame 0.
of equilibrium prices, although a unique value of welfare is obtained, as can be seen in Figure 1 and
Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 In subgame 0 of the National Mixed Duopoly, the national government fully nationalizes
firm 0 (α0 = 1), and the prices, indifferent consumer, profits, consumer surplus and welfare are:
p00 = p
0
1 ∈
[
1,
1− µ
µ
]
; x̂0 =
1
2
;pi00 = µ
p0
2
;pi01 = (1− µ)
p0
2
;CS0 =
4v − 4p0 − 1
8
;W 0 =
4v − 1
8
. (20)
4.2 Subgame 1
The national government now takes a stake in firm 1, so that the objective function of firm 1 is Π1 =
αW + (1− α) pi1. As in the previous subsection, the stage in which firms simultaneously choose prices
is solved first. By maximizing the function Π1 with respect to p1, I obtain the reaction function of the
partially publicly-owned firm 1, which is:
p1 (p0) =
{
1−α
2−α +
p0
2−α if p0 ≤ p1
(1−µ)(1−α)
µ(2−α) +
p0
2−α if p0 ≥ p1
(21)
Firm 0 is private, so it maximizes the profit function (5) and its reaction function is:
p0 (p1) =
{
µ
2(1−µ) +
p1
2 if p0 ≤ p1
1
2 +
p1
2 if p0 ≥ p1.
(22)
Given that firm 0’s reaction function is discontinuous at
√
µ/ (1− µ), it is possible that the two
reaction functions may not intercept as can be seen in Figure 2. In particular, if α > α = 1 − 12
√
µ
1−µ ,
the two reaction functions do not intersect. Otherwise, if α ≤ α, they intercept and the prices are:4
p0 =
1− α+ µ
(1− µ) (3− 2α) ; p1 =
2− µ− 2α (1− µ)
(1− µ) (3− 2α) . (23)
4Notice that p1 =
2−µ−2α(1−µ)
(1−µ)(3−2α)
≥
√
µ
1−µ
if and only if α ≤ α = 1− 1
2
√
µ
1−µ
.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium at subgame 1.
Notice that p0 ≤ p1. By substituting the previous prices (23) in the social welfare function (15), it
is evaluated at the second stage, which coincides with that obtained in previous section, that is (19).
Therefore, taking into account that the social welfare function (19) is increasing when α < 1, there is
no solution when α > α, and α < 1 (since µ ∈ (0, 1/2)), I find that the national government partially
privatize firm 1, as shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In subgame 1 of the National Mixed Duopoly, the national government takes a stake in
firm 1 at α1 = α level.
4.3 Government: firm 0 or 1
Next, I look at which firm the government must take a stake in from a social point of view. The above
subsections show that the government fully nationalizes firm 0 or partially nationalizes firm 1. Notice that
when the government decides its stake in each firm, it faces the same objective function in both subgames.
In particular, it faces the function (19). Given that the social welfare function (19) is increasing when
α < 1, and α1 < α0 = 1, the government takes a stake in firm 0. Therefore, the government fully
nationalizes firm 0 in the SPE of the complete game, which is shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 In the SPE for National Mixed Duopoly, the government fully nationalizes firm 0, so
that the prices, indifferent consumer, profits, consumer surplus and welfare are:
pN0 = p
N
1 = p
N ∈
[
1,
1− µ
µ
]
; x̂N =
1
2
;piN0 =
µpN
2
;piN1 =
(1− µ) pN
2
;CSN0 = µCS
N ; (24)
CSN1 = (1− µ)CSN ;WN0 = µWN ;WN1 = (1− µ)WN ;CSN =
4v − 4pN − 1
8
;WN =
4v − 1
8
.
In contrast to the regional duopoly model, a multiplicity of equilibrium prices is obtained. Thus, both
firms get positive profits, unlike the regional duopoly model. This last result is due to the existence of
a rival private firm whose profit is included in the objective function of the publicly-owned firm, while
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in the regional duopoly both firms are owned by regional governments that are not concerned about the
rival firm’s profit. A strange result is that in the national mixed duopoly both firms set the same price
at the SPE, although they have different objective functions.
Notice that the national producer surplus, defined as piN = piN0 +pi
N
1 , does not depend on µ, although
it does depend positively on prices. However, the profit of each firm is a fraction of the producer surplus,
which is equal to the population density of the region in which it is located. Since µ ∈ (0, 1/2), I find
that piN0 < pi
N
1 . On the consumers side a similar result is observed. In particular, the national consumer
surplus does not depend on µ and the consumer surplus of each region is a fraction of the national
consumer surplus, which is equal to the population density of the region in which consumers are located.
Since µ ∈ (0, 1/2), CSN0 < CSN1 . Thus, the regional social welfare depends on µ so that WN0 < WN1 ,
and the national social welfare does not depend on the relative sizes of the regions (µ).
5 Private Duopoly
We now consider the private duopoly in which the aim of both firms is to maximize their profits. Given
that the market in Region 1 is bigger, the competition between firms focuses on consumers in Region 1.
Thus, the firm located in Region 0 sets a lower price than firm 1 in order to sell its product in Region
1. This contrasts with the result that firms set the same price obtained when they are publicly-owned,
regardless of whether they are national or regional. The private duopoly is analyzed by Gabszewicz and
Wauthy (2012), and their result is reproduced here as follows:
Result 1 (Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012)) Assume µ ∈ (0, 1/2), there is a unique Nash equilib-
rium given by
pP0 =
1 + µ
3 (1− µ) and p
P
1 =
2− µ
3 (1− µ) .
From Gabszewicz and Wauthy’s result, the equilibrium values of the indifferent consumer, firms’
profits, consumer surplus and social welfare at both national and regional level can be found. Given that
pP0 < p
P
1 , I find that the indifferent consumer is located in Region 1, i.e. x̂
P > 1/2, which means that
some consumers in Region 1 buy from firm 0. These additional results are shown in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 In the SPE of the Private Duopoly, the indifferent consumer, firms’ profits, consumer
surplus and social welfare are:
x̂P =
4− 5µ
6 (1− µ) ;pi
P
0 =
(µ+ 1)
2
18 (1− µ) ;pi
P
1 =
(2− µ)2
18 (1− µ) ;CS
P
0 =
µ (12v (1− µ)− µ− 7)
24 (1− µ) ;
CSP1 =
36v (1− µ)2 + µ (46− 13µ)− 31
72 (1− µ) ;CS
P =
36v (1− µ) + 25µ− 16µ2 − 31
72 (1− µ) ;
WP0 =
36vµ (1− µ)− 13µ+ µ2 + 4
72 (1− µ) ;W
P
1 =
12v (1− µ)2 + 10µ− 3µ2 − 5
24 (1− µ) ;
WP =
36v (1− µ) + 17µ− 8µ2 − 11
72 (1− µ) .
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Figure 3: Indifferent Consumer, Prices and Profits.
Firm 0 sets an aggressive price strategy because there are fewer consumers near its location. To
maximize profits, it therefore tries to sell to consumers located in Region 1, although they face a higher
transport cost if they buy from firm 0. On the other hand, firm 1 has more consumers, whose transport
cost is higher when they buy from the rival firm 0. Thus, it can set a higher price without losing many
consumers, so that piP0 < pi
P
1 for µ ∈ (0, 1/2). The stronger competition for Region 1’s consumers and
larger size of Region 1 cause CSP0 < CS
P
1 . Therefore, W
P
0 < W
P
1 . These last results coincide with those
of the previous sections.
A decrease in µ means a bigger gap in size between regions, which leads firm 0 to be more aggressive
in prices in order to enter the larger market of Region 1. In particular, as µ decreases, firm 0 sets a lower
price than firm 1, so the indifferent consumer is located far from the centre (x̂P is decreasing in µ). Thus,
in order to avoid losing more consumers, firm 1 decreases prices but less than firm 0, although the size
of region 1 increases. Therefore, the firm’s profits decrease for the more aggressive price strategy. These
results are summarized in the following proposition and Figure 3:
Proposition 6 In the SPE of the private duopoly:
i) x̂P is decreasing in µ,
ii) pP0 , p
P
1 , pi
P
0 and pi
P
1 are increasing in µ,
iii) ∂p
P
0
∂µ
>
∂pP
1
∂µ
and ∂pi
P
0
∂µ
>
∂piP
1
∂µ
.
6 Equilibrium Analysis
In the private duopoly, firms set different prices so that consumers’ choice depends on their location and
on prices. This implies a social loss because some consumers do not buy from the nearer firm, although
they do buy the cheapest product. In particular, in the private duopoly some consumers in Region 1 buy
from firm 0, which implies higher transport costs for consumers. Moreover, there are more consumers
in Region 1. These facts explain why it is found that the privatization of publicly-owned firms is not
optimal, as can be concluded from the relationship (25). This result holds regardless of whether the
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publicly-owned firms are owned by the national or the regional governments.
WP < WN =WR. (25)
In both regional and national mixed duopolies, firms set the same price and avoid the welfare loss
generated by the high transport costs for consumers in the private duopoly. However, although social
welfare is the same in both market structures, the causes are different. In the regional duopoly both
firms set a price of zero, which maximizes the consumer surplus and social welfare, although the two
regional firms do not obtain profits. On the other hand, in the national mixed duopoly firms set a higher
price than in other market structures, which is strange because a publicly-owned firm normally sets lower
prices. These high prices imply that the consumer surplus is lowest in the national mixed duopoly, while
the producer surplus (pi = pi0 + pi1) is highest, as can be seen in the following relationship:
pR0 = p
R
1 = 0 < p
P
0 < p
P
1 < 1 ≤ pN0 = pN1
CSN < CSP < CSR
piR < piP < piN
I now evaluate social welfare from a regional perspective. From (26) two interesting results can be
observed: i) Region 0 prefers the private duopoly, while Region 1 does not; and ii) like the national
government, both regional governments are indifferent to the level of public intervention, i.e. they are
indifferent between the national mixed duopoly and the regional duopoly. The first result arises because
firm 0 sets a low enough price in the private duopoly to obtain high demand (some consumers located in
Region 1 buy from firm 0) and the transport cost of Region 0’s consumers does no change with respect
to other market structures. Thus, Region 0 prefers the private duopoly. However, in Region 1 consumers
bear a higher transport cost and firm 1’s profit is not too high, so Region 1 prefers (national and regional)
government intervention in the market.5 This second result also arises because both firms set the same
price in the national mixed duopoly and the regional duopoly, so consumers’ choice only depends on
their location. Thus, consumers buy from the firm nearer their location and the price level does not
affect the level of social welfare. However, it does affect welfare distribution between consumers and
firms. Therefore, both regional governments are indifferent between the national mixed duopoly and the
regional duopoly, although consumers and firms are not in agreement. In particular, as can be seen from
relationships (27) and (28), consumers prefer the regional duopoly but firms do not. This is because firms
set their highest prices in the national mixed duopoly and their lowest prices in the regional duopoly.
WN0 =W
R
0 < W
P
0 and W
N
1 =W
R
1 > W
P
1 (26)
CSNi < CS
P
i < CS
R
i i = 0, 1 (27)
piR0 = 0 < pi
P
0  pi
N
0 and pi
R
1 = 0 < pi
P
1 < pi
N
1 (28)
5 It can be checked that piP0 < pi
N
0 if µ > 1/5. Otherwise, it is possible that pi
P
0 ≥ pi
N
0 .
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Figure 4: Optimal Privatization Policy.
6.1 The Fixed Cost of Developing a Product
This subsection extends the social welfare analysis to consider the fixed cost of developing a product,
which is denoted by F ji for firm i = 0, 1 in the market structure j = N,P,R. Thus, the social welfare in
the national mixed, regional and private duopolies are:
W
N
=WN − FN0 − FN1 ;W
R
=WR − FR0 − FR1 ;W
P
=WP − FP0 − FP1 .
For the sake of clarify in the exposition of the results, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 1 Private firms bear the same fixed cost of developing a product independently of their
locations and of the ownership of their rival, i.e. FP0 = F
P
1 = F
N
1 = F
P ; and regional firms bear the
same fixed cost of developing a product independently of their locations, FR0 = F
R
1 = F
R.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the fixed cost borne by firms is relevant in the privatization policies
of national and regional governments. In particular, privatization is found to be socially optimal when
fixed costs of national and regional publicly-owned firms are high enough, and not otherwise. Thus, the
existence of a national publicly-owned firm is socially optimal when its fixed cost is low enough, and a
regional duopoly is optimal when the fixed costs of regional publicly-owned firms are low enough. These
results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 1, the optimal privatization policy is:
i) privatization if FN0 > W
N −WP + FP and FR >
(
WR −WP
)
/2 + FP ,
ii) the existence of a national publicly-owned firm 0 if FN0 < W
N−WP+FP and FR >
(
FN0 + F
P
)
/2,
and,
iii) a regional duopoly if FR < min
{(
FN0 + F
P
)
/2,
(
WR −WP
)
/2 + FP
}
.
An interesting result is shown in Figure 4: the regional duopoly is socially optimal in the red area,
although the fixed cost is lower for the national publicly-owned firm than the regional one. This is because
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there is a private firm in the national mixed duopoly, which bears a higher fixed cost than the regional
publicly-owned firms.6
7 Regional Mixed Duopolies
As can be seen in Section 6, Region 1 prefers the intervention of national or regional governments, while
Region 0 prefers there to be no public intervention. Thus, there are opposed interests between the two
regions, which raises the question of whether there are other duopoly regimes that would improve welfare
in both regions at the same time. In order to answer this question, the following regional mixed duopolies
are considered:
i) regional partially publicly-owned firm 0 competes against private firm 1 (R0);
ii) regional partially publicly-owned firm 1 competes against private firm 0 (R1);
iii) regional partially publicly-owned firm 0 competes against national partially publicly-owned firm
1 (R0N); and
iv) national partially publicly-owned firm 0 competes against regional partially publicly-owned firm
1 (R1N).
7.1 Regional Publicly-owned Firm 0 vs. Private Firm 1 (R0)
In this subsection, the government of Region 0 takes a partial stake in firm 0, so the aim of firm 0
is to maximize the objective function Π0 = α0W0 + (1− α0)pi0, where α0 represents the stake of the
government of Region 0 in firm 0. This firm competes against the private firm 1. The timing of the game
is: i) the regional government chooses the stake in firm 0 that maximizes the social welfare of Region 0;
and finally, ii) firms simultaneously set prices. This game is now solved by backward induction.
As can be seen in Section 3, the reaction function of firm 0 is (11). On the other hand, firm 1 is
private, so it seeks to maximize its profit function (6). Thus, its reaction function is (18) as can be seen
in Subsection 4.1. From the interception of reaction functions (11) and (18), the prices in the second
stage of the game are obtained:
p0 =
1 + µ− 2α0µ
3 (1− µ) ; p1 =
2− µ− α0µ
3 (1− µ) . (29)
Notice that these prices satisfy p0 ≤ p1. By incorporating these prices (29) in the welfare function
(9), the social welfare of Region 0 evaluated at the first stage of this game can be found, i.e.:
W0 (α0) =
36vµ (1− µ)− 4µα0 (1− 5µ+ 2µα0) + 4− 13µ+ µ2
72 (1− µ) . (30)
In order to maximize the Region 0’s welfare, the government of Region 0 does not take a stake in
firm 0 when that region is relatively small enough, µ ≤ 1/5, otherwise, it only takes a partial stake. This
result is consistent with that obtained in Section 6 and is summarized in the following proposition.
6The red area contains FR ≤
(
FN0 + F
P
)
/2 and FR > FN0 . So F
R ≤
(
FN0 + F
P
)
/2 <
(
FR + FP
)
/2. Thus,
FR < FP .
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Proposition 8 In the SPE of the Regional Mixed Duopoly in which regional partially publicly-owned firm
0 competes against private firm 1 (R0), the government of Region 0 fully privatizes firm 0 if µ ≤ 1/5;
otherwise, it partially privatizes firm 0, so that αR00 = (5µ− 1) /4µ.7 Therefore, the same equilibrium
is found as in the Private Duopoly when µ ≤ 1/5; otherwise, the prices, indifferent consumer and social
welfare are as follows:
pR00 =
1
2
; pR01 =
3
4
; x̂R0 =
5
8
;piR00 =
3µ+ 1
16
;piR01 =
9 (1− µ)
32
;CSR00 =
µ (4v − 3)
8
;CSR01 =
(1− µ) (32v − 31)
64
;
CSR0 =
32v + 7µ− 31
64
;WR00 =
8vµ− 3µ+ 1
16
;WR01 =
(1− µ) (32v − 13)
64
;WR0 =
32v + µ− 9
64
.
Proof: see Appendix.
Unlike the case of the regional duopoly, the government of Region 0 does not fully own firm 0, which
implies that firms set different prices. The setting of a lower price by firm 0 causes some consumers in
Region 1 buy from firm 0 since x̂R0 > 1/2, as in the Private Duopoly. These effects generate a welfare loss
because they increase transport costs of consumers. The welfare of the country is also found to depend
positively on the relative size of Region 0, µ. This is because a higher µ implies a lower proportion of
consumers from Region 1 who buy from firm 0,8 which reduces the consumers’ disutility from not buying
at their own location. This effect entails a welfare improvement that comes from a redistribution of
market shares between firms.
From Figure 5, it can be observed that a lower size gap implies a higher regional government stake in
firm 0. Section 6 below shows that Region 0 prefers the private duopoly because of the aggressive price
strategy by firms, especially by firm 0. This is mainly explained by the fact that Region 0’s consumers
can buy cheaper products without assuming higher transport costs in the private duopoly. Moreover,
the price strategy becomes more aggressive when the size gap is bigger. Thus, it is not counterintuitive
for the government of Region 0 to fully privatize firm 0 when the size gap is big enough (in particular,
µ ≤ 1/5), as can be seen in Figure 5. On the other hand, when the size gap is low enough (µ ≥ 1/5) the
government of Region 0 decides to take a bigger stake in firm 0 as the gap decreases because the firm’s
price strategy becomes less aggressive.
7.2 Private Firm 0 vs. Regional Publicly-owned Firm 1 (R1)
Now consider the case where the government of Region 1 takes a stake in firm 1, so firm 1’s aim is
to maximize the objective function Π1 = α1W1 + (1− α1)pi1, where α1 represents the share of the
government of Region 1 in firm 1. This firm competes against the private firm 0. The timing of the game
is: i) the government of Region 1 chooses the stake in firm 1 that maximizes the social welfare of Region
1; and finally ii) firms simultaneously set prices. This game is now solved by backward induction.
Since firm 0 is private, it seeks to maximize its profit function (5). Thus, its reaction function is (22),
as can be seen in Subsection 4.2. On the other hand, firm 1’s aim is to maximize the objective function
7 lim
µ→1/2
5µ−1
4µ
= 3
4
.
8 ∂(x̂
R0)
∂µ
≤ 0
16
0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 3
0 . 4
0 . 5
µ
0
0
R
α
0 . 8
0
0 . 5
0 . 2
Figure 5: Region 0’s stake in firm 0.
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Π1, as in the Regional Duopoly, so its reaction function is (12). From the interception of these reaction
functions, the following price levels are obtained:
p0 =
{
1−α1+µ
(1−µ)(3−α1) if α1 ≤
1−2µ
1−µ
1−α1+µ+µα1
3µ if α1 ≥ 1−2µ1−µ
; p1 =
{
(2−µ)(1−α1)
(1−µ)(3−α1) if α1 ≤
1−2µ
1−µ
2−µ−2α1(1−µ)
3µ if α1 ≥ 1−2µ1−µ .
(31)
By incorporating these prices into the welfare function (10), the social welfare of Region 1 evaluated
at the first stage of this game can be found, i.e.:
W1 (α1) =

4v(1−µ)2(3−α1)2+18α1+30µ−7α21−9µ2−3α21µ2−32α1µ+10α1µ2+10α21µ−15
8(1−µ)(3−α1)2 if α1 ≤
1−2µ
1−µ
36vµ(1−µ)+16α1+11µ−8α21+µ2−8α21µ2−36α1µ+20α1µ2+16α21µ−8
72µ if α1 ≥ 1−2µ1−µ .
(32)
In order to maximize Region 1’s welfare, the government of Region 1 takes a partial stake in firm 1,
which contrasts with the result obtained in the Regional Duopoly, in which the regional government fully
owns firm 1. This result is summarized in Proposition 9.
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Proposition 9 An SPE of the Regional Mixed Duopoly in which regional partially publicly-owned firm
1 competes against private firm 0 (R1) exists if and only if µ ≥ 1/10. In the SPE of the game the
government of Region 1 decides to take a partial stake in firm 1, so the regional government’s stake, the
prices, indifferent consumer and social welfare are:9
i) if 110 ≤ µ ≤ 15 ,
αR11 =
2− µ− 3µ
√
µ
1−µ
2 (1− µ) ; p
R1
0 =
1
2
+
√
µ
2
√
1− µ ; p
R1
1 =
√
µ
1− µ ; x̂
R1 =
1
4
+
√
µ
4
√
1− µ ;
piR10 =
µ
8
(
1 +
√
µ
1− µ
)2
;piR11 =
1
4
√
µ
1− µ
(
2− µ− µ
√
µ
1− µ
)
;
CSR10 =
µ
16
(
8v − 6 + 1
1− µ − 6
√
µ
1− µ
)
;CSR11 =
1− µ
8
(
4v − 1− 4
√
µ
1− µ
)
;
CSR1 =
1
16
(
8v − 2− 8
√
µ
1− µ + µ
(
1
1− µ − 4 + 2
√
µ
1− µ
))
;WR10 =
µ
16
(
8v − 6 + 3
1− µ − 2
√
µ
1− µ
)
;
WR11 =
1
8
(
4v + 1− 2
1− µ + µ
(
3− 4v + 2
√
µ
1− µ
))
;WR1 =
1
16
(
8v − 1− 1
1− µ + 2µ
√
µ
1− µ
)
.
if 15 ≤ µ < 12 ,
αR11 =
4− 5µ
4− 4µ ; p
R1
0 =
3
4
; pR11 =
1
2
; x̂R1 =
3
8
;piR10 =
9µ
32
;piR11 =
4− 3µ
16
;
CSR10 =
µ (32v − 31)
64
;CSR11 =
(1− µ) (4v − 3)
8
;CSR1 =
32v − 7µ− 24
64
;
WR10 =
µ (32v − 13)
64
;WR11 =
8v (1− µ) + 3µ− 2
16
;WR1 =
32v − µ− 8
64
.
Notice that the government of Region 1 partially privatizes the firm located in its region, so it sets the
lowest prices, which contrasts with the results of the other duopolies. Thus, the regional partially publicly-
owned firm 1 sells to some consumers in Region 0, which generates a welfare loss because it increases the
transport costs of those consumers since they buy from the firm furthest from their location. In addition,
a smaller size gap (a higher µ) implies a higher private incentive for firm 1 to sell to consumers located in
Region 0. Thus, it is less necessary for the regional government to intervene in firm 1 in order to improve
welfare in Region 1, i.e. the stake taken by the government of Region 1 in firm 1 decreases as µ increases,
as can be seen in Figure 7.
7.3 Regional Publicly-owned Firm 0 vs. National Publicly-owned Firm 1
(R0N)
This subsection examines the case where the government of Region 0 takes a stake in firm 0, so firm 0’s
aim is to maximize the objective function Π0 = α0W0+(1− α0)pi0, while the national government takes
a stake in firm 1, so firm 1’s aim is to maximize the objective function Π1 = αW +(1− α)pi1. The timing
of the game is: i) the national and regional governments simultaneously choose their stakes in firms 1
9The condition µ ≥ 1/5 ensures that pR11 =
1
2
≤
√
µ
1−µ
, and, the condition µ ≥ 1/10 ensures that αR11 ≤ 1.
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and 0, respectively; and finally ii) firms simultaneously set prices. This game is now solved by backward
induction.
From the Regional Duopoly it is known that regional firm 0’s reaction function is (11), and from the
National Mixed Duopoly it is known that national firm 1’s reaction function is (21). In the interception
of these reaction functions, the following price levels are obtained:
p0 =
1− α− µα0 (2− α) + µ
(1− µ) (3− 2α) ; p1 =
2− 2α− µ+ 2αµ− µα0
(1− µ) (3− 2α) . (33)
Notice that p0 ≤ p1. By incorporating these prices into the welfare functions (9) and (15), the welfare
of Region 0 and the country evaluated at the first stage of this game can be found, i.e.:
W0 =
µ (4v − 1)
8
+
(1− α) (1− 2µ+ µα0) (1− α+ µ− 2µα0 + αµα0)
2 (1− µ) (3− 2α)2
W =
4v − 1
8
− 2 (1− 2µ+ µα0)
2 (1− α)2
8 (1− µ) (3− 2α)2
The government of Region 0 chooses the α0 that maximizes W0, and the national government chooses
the α that maximizes W . Thus, the reaction functions of the two governments are:
α0 (α) =
5µ− 1− 2αµ
2µ (2− α) ;α (α0) = 1 (34)
From the interception of the above function it is obtained that the government of Region 0 takes
a partial stake in firm 0 (α0 = (3µ− 1) /2µ), while the national government fully nationalizes firm 1.
However, the price reaction functions of the two firms do not intercept, as can be seen in Figure 8, which
implies that there is no SPE in this regional mixed duopoly. This kind of regional mixed duopoly is
therefore not considered in the rest of this study.
Proposition 10 In the Regional Mixed Duopoly R0N there is no SPE.
Proof: see Appendix.
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Figure 8: Regional Mixed Duopoly R0N.
7.4 National Publicly-owned Firm 0 vs. Regional Publicly-owned Firm 1
(R1N)
The government of Region 1 takes a stake in firm 1, so firm 1’s aim is to maximize the objective function
Π1 = α1W1 + (1− α1) pi1, and the national government takes a stake in firm 0, so firm 0’s aim is to
maximize the objective function Π0 = αW + (1− α) pi0. The timing of the game is: i) the national and
regional governments simultaneously choose their stakes in firms 0 and 1, respectively; and finally ii) the
two firms simultaneously set prices. This game is now solved by backward induction.
As can be seen in the National Mixed Duopoly, firm 0’s reaction function is (17), and in the Regional
Duopoly firm 1’s reaction function is (12). From the interception of these reaction functions, the following
price levels are obtained:
p0 =
{
µ−2αµ−α1+αµα1+1
(3−2α−α1+αα1)(1−µ) if α1 ≤
1−2µ
1−µ
µ−2αµ+1−α1+µα1
µ(3−2α) if α1 ≥ 1−2µ1−µ
; p1 =
{
(1−α1)(2−α−µ)
(3−2α−α1+αα1)(1−µ) if α1 ≤
1−2µ
1−µ
(1−α1+µα1)(2−α)−µ
µ(3−2α) if α1 ≥ 1−2µ1−µ
By incorporating these prices into the welfare functions (10) and (15), the social welfare of Region 1
and of the country evaluated at the first stage of this game is obtained, i.e.:
W1 =

(1−µ)(4v−1)
8 −
2(3−α−3α1−2αµ+αα1+µα1+αµα1)(1−2µ−α1+µα1)(1−α)
8(1−µ)(−2α−α1+αα1+3)2 if α1 ≤
1−2µ
1−µ
(1−µ)(4v−1)µ(2α−3)2−4(1−α)(1−2µ−α1+µα1)(αα1−µ−2α1−α+2µα1−αµα1+2)
8µ(3−2α)2 if α1 ≥
1−2µ
1−µ
W =

4v−1
8 +
2(1−α)2(1−2µ−α1+µα1)2
8(µ−1)(3−2α−α1+αα1)2 if α1 ≤
1−2µ
1−µ
4v−1
8 −
2(1−α)2(1−2µ−α1+µα1)2
8µ(3−2α)2 if α1 ≥
1−2µ
1−µ
The national government chooses the α that maximizes W , and the government of Region 1 chooses
the α1 that maximizes W1. Thus, the reaction functions of the two governments are:
α (α1) = 1;α1 (α) =
{
3−α−3µ
3−α−2µ if α1 ≤ 1−2µ1−µ
4−2α−5µ+2αµ
4−2α−4µ+2αµ if α1 ≥ 1−2µ1−µ
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Figure 9: Regional Mixed Duopoly R1N.
As can be seen in Proposition 11, the government of Region 1 takes a partial stake in firm 1 and
the national government fully nationalizes firm 0.10 This result contrasts with that obtained in previous
literature by Tomaru and Nakamura (2012), who obtain that when the national and regional governments
independently consider whether to privatize their respective public firms, only the state-owned public firm
should be privatized.11 Moreover, I find that there is a multiplicity of equilibrium prices, as in the national
mixed duopoly.
Proposition 11 In the SPE of the Regional Mixed Duopoly R1N, the national government fully con-
trols firm 0 and the government of Region 1 decides to take a partial stake in firm 1, so the regional
government’s stakes, prices, the indifferent consumer and social welfare are:12
αR1N = 1;αR1N1 =
2− 3µ
2 (1− µ) ; p
R1N
0 = p
R1N
1 = p
R1N ∈
[
µ
2 (1− µ) ,
1
2
]
; x̂R1N =
1
2
;piR1N0 =
µpR1N
2
;
piR1N1 =
(1− µ) pR1N
2
;CSR1N0 =
µ
(
4v − 4pR1N − 1
)
8
;CSR1N1 =
(1− µ)
(
4v − 4pR1N − 1
)
8
;
CSR1N =
4v − 4pNR − 1
8
;WR1N0 = µ
4v − 1
8
;WR1N1 = (1− µ)
4v − 1
8
;WR1N =
4v − 1
8
The government of Region 1 partially privatizes firm 1 but it does not set a lower price than firm
0, as in the regional mixed duopoly R1. This is because of the full control of firm 0 by the national
government, which tries to avoid the welfare loss generated by consumers’ disutility from not buying
from the nearest firm. Thus, in equilibrium, both firms set the same prices and the maximum social
welfare level is achieved, as in the National Mixed Duopoly and the Regional Duopoly.
As in the previous regional mixed duopolies, the government of Region 1 increases its stake in firm 1
as the relative size of Region 1 increases. The intuition behind this is that a bigger Region 1 reduces the
10Notice that αR1N1 =
2−3µ
2(1−µ)
> 1−2µ
1−µ
.
11Tomaru and Nakamura (2012) develop a mixed oligopoly model with quantity competition, in which firms produce a
homogenous good and governments do not consider the option of partial privatization.
12Given that αR1N = 1, there is no discontinuity in p0 (p1). Thus, the two price reaction functions always intercept.
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Figure 10: Regional 1’s stake in firm 1.
incentive of private firm 1 to compete for new consumers, but increases the incentives of private firm 0.
These firms’ reactions entail that some consumers of Region 1 can buy from firm 0, which generates a
social loss in Region 1 because it increases the transport cost of consumers when they buy from the firm
furthest away. Thus, when the relative size of Region 1 increases, the government of Region 1 must take
a bigger stake in firm 1 to avoid increasing the transport cost of consumers located in that region, as can
be seen in Figure 10.
Given that pR1N0 = p
R1N
1 = 1/2 is an equilibrium for all values of µ, these equilibrium prices for the
regional mixed duopoly R1N are considered in the following section, which compares the equilibria of the
different market structures. This assumption only affects the consumer surplus and profit comparisons.
8 Social Welfare Analysis
By comparing the social welfare obtained in the duopolies considered above, the following relationship
between them is found:
WR0 ≤ WP ≤WR1 < WN =WR1N =WR if µ ≤ 1
2
− 3
√
73
146
(35)
WR0 < WR1 ≤WP < WN =WR1N =WR if µ ≥ 1
2
− 3
√
73
146
From the relationship (35), it can be concluded that (national or regional) public intervention is
essential for the social optimum to be achieved, because the private duopoly provides lower welfare than
the social optimum. However, it is not the worst market structure from the social welfare viewpoint
when mixed regional duopolies are considered in the analysis of social welfare. The market structure
that provides the lowest welfare is the regional mixed duopoly in which the government of Region 0 fully
owns firm 0, while firm 1 is private (R0). The intuition is that the regional mixed duopoly R0 provides
the lowest social welfare for Region 1, as can be seen in (39), and this region is more densely populated
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than Region 0. On the other hand, there are several ways to attain the social optimum, as specified in
the following proposition:
Proposition 12 The market structures that achieve the social optimum are:
i) each regional government fully controls the firm located in its region (Regional Duopoly);
ii) the government of Region 1 partially owns firm 1, while the national government fully owns firm 0
(Regional Mixed Duopoly R1N); and,
iii) the national government fully owns firm 0, while firm 1 is private (National Mixed Duopoly).
A striking result is that the full ownership of firm 0 by the national government ensures that the
social optimum is achieved independently of the ownership of firm 1 (private or public). Thus, regional
government intervention in firm 1 is not necessary in order to achieve the social optimum.
As can be seen from the relationships (36) and (37), the preferences of consumers and firms about
market structures are completely opposite.13 For instance, the national mixed duopoly is the best outcome
for firms, but the worst for consumers, while the regional duopoly is the best outcome for consumers and
the worst outcome for firms. The regional mixed duopolies provide intermediate levels of consumer and
producer surpluses. However, those regional mixed duopolies in which one firm is private are worse from
the consumers’ perspective, but better from the producers’ perspective.
CSN < CSP ≤ CSR0 < CSR1N < CSR1 < CSR if µ ≤ 0.1741889 (36)
CSN < CSP ≤ CSR0 < CSR1 < CSR1N < CSR if µ ≥ 0.1741889
piR < piR1 ≤ piR1N < piR0 ≤ piP < piN if µ ≤ 0.17788 (37)
piR < piR1N ≤ piR1 < piR0 ≤ piP < piN if µ ≥ 0.17788
Two interesting and logical results are obtained from (38) and (39). First, in each region, the social
welfare is maximized when the regional government fully controls the firm in its region and the rival
firm is private. Second, the regional welfare is minimized when the firm in the region is private and the
rival firm is fully owned by the government of the neighboring region. These results are in line with
those obtained by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2005b), who analyze a quantity competition model with
homogenous goods, where the governments decide whether to privatize a public firm or not. They obtain
that when the marginal cost of the publicly-owned firms takes an intermediate value, each government
wants it to be the government of the other country that privatizes its publicly-owned firm. In this case,
the latter government obtains lower social welfare than the other. Finally, I find that the regional mixed
duopoly R1N provides the same welfare as the national mixed and regional duopolies in each region.
WR10 < W
R
0 =W
R1N
0 =W
N
0 < W
P
0 ≤WR00 (38)
13pij = pij0 + pi
j
1 is defined as the producer surplus in market structure j = R,N,P,R0, R1, R1N .
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WR01 ≤WP1 < WR1 =WR1N1 =WN1 < WR11 (39)
Notice that the private duopoly ceases to be the best outcome for the Region 0. This is because the
consumer surplus is higher in Region 0 in the regional mixed duopoly R0, as can be seen in (40). Moreover,
from relationships (40) and (41), it can be seen that the regional duopoly maximizes the consumer
surpluses in both regions, while the national mixed duopoly minimizes it. This is because firms set a
price of zero in the regional duopoly, while they set the highest prices in the national mixed duopoly.
CSN0 < CS
R1
0 < CS
R1N
0 ≤ CSP0 = CSR00 < CSR0 if µ ≤
1
5
(40)
CSN0 < CS
R1
0 ≤ CSP0 ≤ CSR1N0 = CSR00 < CSR0 if
1
5
≤ µ ≤ 37
101
CSN0 < CS
P
0 ≤ CSR10 < CSR1N0 = CSR00 < CSR0 if
37
101
≤ µ
CSN1 < CS
P
1 ≤ CSR01 < CSR1N1 ≤ CSR11 < CSR1 (41)
9 Conclusions
In this paper I analyze the privatization policies implemented by national and regional governments by
considering a horizontal differentiation model with price competition in which a country is divided into
two regions. Following Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012), I assume that those regions are of different sizes.
An underlying overall conclusion of this paper is that the relative size of the regions is an important
feature in the design of the privatization policies implemented by national and regional governments.
My analysis shows that public intervention by either the national or regional government is essential
for achieving the social optimum. Thus, there are several ways to attain the social optimum: i) the
firm located in the less populated region, firm 0, is fully controlled by the national government while
the firm located in more populated region, firm 1, is private (national mixed duopoly); ii) each firm is
owned by the government of the region where it is located (regional duopoly); and iii) firm 0 is owned
by the national government while firm 1 is partially owned by the government of the region where it is
located (regional mixed duopoly R1N). The private duopoly does not achieve the social optimum because
it increases the consumers’ disutility from not buying from the nearest firm. However, not all public
interventions in firms are better than the private duopoly. For instance, the market structure in which
the government of the less populated region takes a stake in firm 0 and firm 1 is private provides the
lowest social welfare, and when the two regions are similar enough in size the market structure in which
the government of the more populated region takes a stake in firm 1 and firm 0 is private also provides
lower social welfare than the private duopoly.
An interesting result is that the preferences of consumers and firms about market structures are
completely opposite. For instance, the national mixed duopoly is the best outcome for firms but the worst
for consumers, while the regional duopoly is the best outcome for consumers and the worst outcome for
firms. In addition, regional governments have higher incentives to control the firm located at their region
as the relative size of that region increases. The intuition behind this is that a bigger region reduces the
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incentives of the private firm in the region to compete for new consumers, but increases the incentives
of the rival firm located in the neighboring region. These firms’ reactions generate a social loss because
they increase the disutility of the consumers of the region from not buying from the nearest firm. Thus,
when the relative size of a region increases, the regional government must take a bigger stake in the firm
located in that region.
Finally, from a regional perspective, social welfare in each region is maximized when the regional
government fully controls the firm in its region and the rival firm is private, while regional welfare is
minimized when the firm in the region is private and the rival firm is fully owned by the government of
the neighboring region. These results are in line with those of Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2005b), who
analyze an oligopoly model with quantity competition and homogenous goods where governments decide
whether to privatize a public firm or not.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 8. Firm 1 is private, so its reaction function is (18), which is continuous. On
the other hand, firm 0 is fully privatized if µ ≤ 15 because of αR00 = 0, so its reaction function is (22),
which is discontinuous at p1 =
√
µ
1−µ . Given that p
P
1 =
2−µ
3(1−µ) >
√
µ
1−µ , it is obtained that the two
reaction functions intercept, so the equilibrium exists as in the private duopoly (see Gabszewicz and
Wauthy (2012) for more details). If µ ≥ 15 , firm 0 is partially privatized because of αR00 = 5µ−14µ . Thus,
its reaction function is
p0 (p1) =

1
8 +
p1
2 if p0 ≤ p1
(p1 + 1)
(
1−µ
3µ+1
)
if p0 ≥ p1,
which is discontinuous at p˜1 =
µ(6−5µ)−1−2
√
2
√
(1−µ)(1+3µ)(1−2µ)2
44µ2−8µ−4 . Given that p
R0
1 =
3
4 > p˜1, it is
obtained that the two reaction functions intercept, so the equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 10. From the interception of the reaction functions for the stakes of the
government of Region 0 and the national government, (34), the following is obtained:
α0 =
{
0 if µ ≤ 13
3µ−1
2µ if µ ≥ 13
;α = 1.
Case I: µ ≤ 1/3. Notice that firm 0 is private, so the price reaction functions of firm 0 is (22). The
price reaction function of firm 1 is p1 (p0) = p0. Given that
µ
2(1−µ) <
1
2 and
µ
1−µ < 1, the function (22) is
discontinuous. By solving pi0
(
µ
2(1−µ) +
p1
2 , p1
)
= pi0
(
1
2 +
p1
2 , p1
)
, it is obtained that it is discontinuous
at p1 =
√
µ
1−µ ∈
(
µ
1−µ , 1
)
. Given that µ1−µ <
√
µ
1−µ < 1, it is found that the functions (22) and
p1 (p0) = p0 do not intercept. Therefore, there is no SPE when µ ≤ 1/3.
Case II: µ ≥ 1/3. Notice that firm 0 is partially privatized because of α0 = 3µ−12µ ∈ [0, 1), so the price
reaction functions of firm 0 is
p0 (p1) =
{
1
4 +
p1
2 if p0 ≤ p1
(p1 + 1)
1−µ
µ+1 if p0 ≥ p1,
(42)
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As in Case I, the price reaction function of firm 1 is p1 (p0) = p0. Given that
1
4 <
1−µ
µ+1 and
1
2 <
1−µ
2µ ,
the function (42) is discontinuous. By solving Π0
(
1
4 +
p1
2 , p1
)
= Π0
(
(p1 + 1)
1−µ
µ+1 , p1
)
, it is obtained
that it is discontinuous at p1 ∈
[
1
2 ,
1−µ
2µ
]
. Thus, given that p0 = p1 in the equilibrium, there are two
equilibrium candidates: 1) p10 = p
1
1 =
1
2 , and 2) p
2
0 = p
2
1 =
1−µ
2µ .
Equilibrium candidate 1) is now analyzed. If p1 =
1
2 , the partially publicly-owned firm 0 can set
p0 =
1
2 and obtain Π0
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
= 12vµ−4v−5µ+316 , or set the price p0 =
3(1−µ)
2(µ+1) and obtain Π0
(
3(1−µ)
2(µ+1) ,
1
2
)
=
8vµ−4v−10µ+3µ2+12vµ2+5
16(µ+1) . Since Π0
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
< Π0
(
3(1−µ)
2(µ+1) ,
1
2
)
, the best response of firm 0 is to set p0 =
3(1−µ)
2(µ+1) if p1 =
1
2 . Thus, p
1
0 = p
1
1 =
1
2 is not an equilibrium.
Equilibrium candidate 2) is now analyzed. If p1 =
1−µ
2µ , the partially publicly-owned firm 0 can
set p0 =
1−µ
2µ and obtain Π0
(
1−µ
2µ ,
1−µ
2µ
)
= 2−3µ−4vµ−µ
2+12vµ2
16µ , or set the price p0 =
1
4µ and obtain
Π0
(
1
4µ ,
1−µ
2µ
)
= 1−µ+2µ
2−6µ3−8vµ2+24vµ3
32µ2 . Since Π0
(
1−µ
2µ ,
1−µ
2µ
)
< Π0
(
1
4µ ,
1−µ
2µ
)
, the best response of
firm 0 is to set p0 =
1
4µ if p1 =
1−µ
2µ . Thus, p
2
0 = p
2
1 =
1−µ
2µ is not an equilibrium.
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